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Discovery Disclosure and Deterrence
Sergio J. Campos*
Cheng Li**
Courts, practitioners, and scholars have recently expressed
concern over the ex post costs of discovery in civil litigation. In this
Article, we develop a game theoretic model of litigant behavior to study
an overlooked phenomenon-the ex ante effects of discovery on a
defendant's incentive to engage in unlawful conduct. We focus on
motions to seal, which limit the disclosure of discovered information to
the public, but permit disclosure to the court and parties. Specifically,
we examine the effect different rules regarding such motions have in
deterringdefendants from engaging in unlawful behavior. We show that
as a rule becomes more permissible in granting motions to seal, a
potential defendant has greater incentive to engage in unlawful actions
that would result in reputationalloss. The welfare effect of this result,
however, is ambiguous because protecting a defendant from such
reputational losses may be welfare enhancing. After setting forth the
model, we discuss extensions and provide some thoughts on further
directionsfor research.
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INTRODUCTION

There has been a recent focus by federal courts, rulemakers,
practitioners, and scholars on the costs of discovery.' Discovery is a
phase of litigation that allows the parties to compel the production of
evidence from each other and third parties. Because, under the
"American rule," the parties bear their own litigation costs, 2 Courts and
scholars have focused on the strategic use of discovery to impose costs
on opposing parties. 3 The potential for such strategic behavior has
inspired recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
such as an amendment making clear to trial courts that they have the
discretion to refuse to enforce discovery requests that they do not
consider "proportional." 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressed
concern in the context of pleading that "the threat of discovery expense
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before
5
reaching those proceedings."
Although the ex post costs of discovery are a worthy area of
study, in this Article we examine an often overlooked phenomenonthe effect of discovery on a party's ex ante behavior. Here we focus on
the ability of the parties to control the disclosure of information.
Specifically, we focus on motions to seal, which allow a party to disclose
information to the judge -and to the other parties but withhold

1.
E.g., William H.J. Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation,
83 CATH. U. L. REV. 867, 868 (2015) (noting that "there is no shortage of anecdotes decrying
excessive costs and burdens of discovery (usually from the defense bar)," although further noting
that "it is hard to judge the extent of these problems or what, if anything, should be done about
them"). A number of articles presented in this symposium also demonstrate a concern with
discovery costs. See, e.g., Jessica Erickson, Bespoke Discovery, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1873 (2018)
("Parties complain that discovery is too expensive. . . ."); Alexandra D. Lahav, A Proposal to End
Discovery Abuse, 71 VAND. L. REV. 2037 (2018) (highlighting that critics of discovery "focus[]
mostly on its private, largely monetary, costs and benefit").
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
2.
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982).
3.
Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionalityin
Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1103-05 (2016). For a classic statement of this problem, see Frank
H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1989).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); see also Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 3, at 1095 (noting that
4.
the 2015 Amendments "continue [a] trend" of "focus[ing] on organizational changes to the
rules, . . . motivated by the assumption that sparse use of the proportionality rule resulted, in part,
from the courts' and litigants' lack of knowledge regarding the Rules' applicability to their case").
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007).
5.

2018]

DISCOVERY DISCLOSURE AND DETERRENCE

1995

information from the public. In general, courts recognize a common law
"right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents."6 Nevertheless, the right is not
absolute, and in some circumstances a party can move to seal
documents from public disclosure if, for example, "the release of the
documents will cause competitive harm to a business."7
Motions to seal are not covered by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but their prevalence in civil litigation has caused many
federal districts to adopt local rules governing such motions.8 Despite
their prevalence, motions to seal have not been examined in great detail
by scholars.
In this Article we develop a game theoretic model of litigant
behavior to study the effect of different rules regarding motions to seal
on a potential defendant's incentive to engage in unlawful conduct.
When deciding whether to take an unlawful action, the potential
defendant weighs the benefits and costs of the action, including the
reputational loss that the potential defendant may suffer. In general,
motions to seal allow a party to avoid the reputational loss from
choosing an action. Accordingly, by shielding a defendant from
reputational losses, a defendant has a greater incentive to engage in
unlawful actions insofar as they generate such losses. The model
confirms this intuition, showing that as motions to seal are more likely
to be granted, a potential defendant is more likely to engage in unlawful
conduct. This means a more permissible rule on sealing may result in
lower deterrence. To our knowledge, this is the first article that points
out this potential cost of granting motions to seal in discovery.
A potential benefit of granting motions to seal is that it can
prevent the chilling of risky, but socially optimal, conduct. In Part V,
we extend our model to consider the chilling effect of a more permissible
rule with regard to motions to seal. We show that a more permissible
rule can either increase or decrease the chilling of a risky but socially
optimal act depending on the initial rule on sealing. We also show that
the deterrence effects we identify in the baseline model continue to exist
in the alternative model.
Finally, the parties may be able to avoid reputational losses by
settling a dispute prior to discovery. By settling prediscovery, the
parties would have no need to file a motion to seal to prevent the public
disclosure of information harmful to the defendant's reputation. In
Part VI, we extend our model to include the possibility of prediscovery

6.
7.
8.

Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
See, e.g., S.D. FLA. R. 5.4(b) (detailing procedure for filing under seal in civil cases).
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settlement. We show that even when the parties can settle prior to
discovery, the incentive to engage in unlawful action still increases as
the permissibility of a motion to seal rule increases.
The Article is presented as follows. Part I presents a literature
review. Part II develops the game theoretic model. Part III solves for
the equilibrium of the game. Part IV considers the impact of different
rules regarding motions to seal on deterrence. Part V discusses an
alternative model that takes into account the effect of such rules on the
chilling of conduct. Part VI extends the model to include the possibility
of prediscovery settlement. The Appendix provides formal proofs of our
results.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW

For purposes of this Article, we focus on motions to seal in
federal courts. For dispositive motions, courts typically grant a motion
to seal only if "compelling reasons" are shown.9 Courts have found
"compelling reasons" when court records may "become a vehicle for
improper purposes" such as the use of records "to gratify spite, promote
public scandal," "to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for public
consumption," or to serve "as sources of business information that
might harm a litigant's competitive standing."1 0 A "compelling reasons"
standard applies to dispositive motions because "the resolution of a
dispute on the merits, whether by trial or summary judgment, is at the
heart of the interest in ensuring the public's understanding of the
judicial process and of significant public events.""1
A lower, "good cause" standard applies to nondispositive
motions, as "those documents are often unrelated, or tangentially
related, to the underlying cause of action." 12 This standard mirrors the
"good cause" standard that applies to protective orders under Rule
26(c). 13 Moreover, a majority of circuits have gone further to conclude
that the public does not have presumptive access to pretrial discovery
materials because "a holding that discovery motions and supporting
materials are subject to a presumptive right of access would make raw
9.
See Apple, 727 F.3d at 1221 (acknowledging that compelling reasons can outweigh the
strong presumption of access by overriding public policy toward disclosure).
10. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
11. Kamakana v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted);
see also Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988).
12. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33
(1984)).
13. See Apple, 727 F.3d at 1222; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) ("The court may, for good cause,
issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.").
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discovery, ordinarily inaccessible to the public, accessible merely
because it had to be included in motions precipitated by inadequate
discovery responses or overly aggressive discovery demands."1 4
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the decision to seal
records "is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a
discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case."" In exercising this discretion,
"[c]ourts have weighed competing interests in a variety of contexts in
determining whether to grant access to judicial documents." 16 For
example, courts weigh the presumption in favor of access against "law
enforcement concerns, judicial efficiency, and the privacy interests of
the parties." 17
Few scholars have examined motions to seal in depth. Those
articles that have examined the policies behind sealing, or discovery
disclosure in general, tend to weigh the benefits of making the
8
adjudicatory process transparent with the privacy costs of the parties.1
14. Leucadia Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech. Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993); see also
SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that discovery materials "do
not carry a presumption of public access"); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986)
("There is no tradition of public access to discovery, and requiring a trial court to scrutinize
carefully public claims of access would be incongruous with the goals of the discovery process.")
Nevertheless, some circuits have extended the right to access when such access can be inferred
from the federal rules. See Pub. Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 790 (1st Cir. 1988)
(modifying a protective order under Rule 26(c)); see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821
F.2d 139, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Unless the public has a presumptive right of access to discovery
materials, the party seeking to protect the materials would have no need for a judicial order [under
Rule 26(c)] since the public would not be allowed to examine the materials in any event.").
15. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.
16. United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing cases).
17. See, e.g., Diversified Grp., Inc. v. Daugerdas, 217 F.R.D. 152, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting
that, in determining whether to unseal documents, such "countervailing factors" must be
considered against "the presumption of access" of certain judicial documents); see also Dependable
Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Truecar, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 653, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (in deciding on motion
to seal, court must weigh presumption of access "against 'countervailing factors,' including 'the
privacy interests of those resisting disclosure'" (quoting Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435
F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006))).
18. See Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public By Order of the Court: The Case
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711 (2003) (arguing in favor of document
public access and against court-imposed secrecy); Dennis J. Drasco, Public Access to Information
in Civil Litigation vs. Litigant's Demand for Privacy: Is the Vanishing Trial an Avoidable
Consequence, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 155 (discussing the impact of electronic filing on the public's
access to trial dockets); T.S. Ellis III, Sealing, Judicial Transparency and JudicialIndependence,
53 VILL. L. REV. 939 (2008) (proposing that minimizing court document sealing and justifying
sealing on the public record will bolster judicial independence); Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and
Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information Generated Through
Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375 (2006) (asserting that the current litigation discovery access
rules do not adequately protect or promote judicial accountability or public confidence in the
judicial system); Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481 (2008)
(proposing that new court data extraction technology can positively transform the court system
into an even more transparent one); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and
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Some
scholars
have
further
noted
the
importance
of
"disseminat[ing] ... vital information relevant to public health and
safety."19 Others have focused on the source and scope of the right to
public access. 20 But no article, as far as we know, has addressed the
effects of motions to seal or other disclosure procedures on ex ante
behavior.
In developing the model below, we have relied on prior work
modeling litigant behavior and the deterrence effect of law enforcement.
We rely, in particular, on prior work that examines the effect of tort
reforms on incentives to obey the law and incentives for care, 21 as well
as work on the theory of optimal law enforcement. 22 Our own prior work
with Christopher Cotton has analyzed how heightening pleadings
standards may reduce deterrence. 2 3
II. MODEL

In this Part, we present a game theoretic model of litigant
behavior. There are two players: a potential plaintiff P (she) who may
experience harm and a potential defendant D (he) who may be liable for
the harm.
In the first stage, D chooses between actions ao and al, where ao
represents a lawful action that benefits or otherwise does not harm P
and al represents an unlawful action that imposes a negative
externality on P. If D takes costless action al, P experiences a loss of
value h > 0 with probability one, making D "liable" for Ps harm. The
lawful action ao decreases the probability that P suffers a loss, but
imposes costs on D. If D takes action ao, he pays cost K > 0, and P
experiences loss h with probability 7, which represents a value between
PublicAccess to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991) (rejecting court reforms increasing public
access to discovery documents as jeopardizing privacy and property interests); Seymour
Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party Access to PretrialInformation in the Federal Courts
1938-2006, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 817 (2007) (advocating that the public's legitimate interests in
materials gained through discovery should require requisite filing of discovery materials).
19. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 403; Moskowitz, supra note 18, at 822.
20. See Daniel Lombard, Top Secret: A Constitutional Look at the Procedural Problems
Inherent in Sealing Civil Court Documents, 55 DEPAuL L. REV. 1067 (2005) (exploring the
procedural issues for right of access to judicial documents and suggesting that a Fourth
Amendment framework could best protect First Amendment access rights); Meliah Thomas, The
First Amendment Right of Access to Docket Sheets, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1537 (2006) (arguing that
public access to docket sheets should be afforded First Amendment protection and should be
restricted only in narrow circumstances).
21. I.P.L. Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, 34 J. PUB. ECON. 61 (1987).
22. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey
the Law, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99 (1989) (providing a survey of the literature).
23. Sergio J. Campos, Christopher S. Cotton & Cheng Li, DeterrenceEffects Under Twombly:
On the Costs of IncreasingPleadingStandards in Litigation, 44 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 61 (2015).

2018]

DISCOVERY DISCLOSURE AND DETERRENCE

1999

zero and one. D is "not liable" for Ps loss if he takes the lawful action
ao. One can think of action ao as any costly action that reduces the
expected losses of P. For example, when firms perform costly product
quality inspections, firms are less likely to produce, and thus consumers
are less likely to purchase, defective products. Let q indicate D's
liability: q = 1 if D is liable, and q = 0 otherwise.
In the second stage, P observes the harm she experienced but
not D's action or liability. She then decides whether to sue D. If P sues
D, the game proceeds to the third stage. If P does not sue D, the game
ends.
The third stage of the game represents the discovery phase of
litigation. To simplify the analysis, we abstract from the details of
discovery and assume that it perfectly reveals D's liability to P.24 To
further simplify matters, we assume that the information revealed in
discovery is accessible and can be widely disseminated to the public. If
the public learns that D is liable for Ps loss, D suffers a reputational
loss L > 0. Reputational losses arising from a finding of liability are
common, as evidenced by the efforts of potential defendants in a number
of industries to reduce or avoid such losses through the use of
arbitration, nondisclosure agreements, public relations firms, and
similar measures. 25 However, D can file a motion to seal, which it can
use to withhold sufficient information from the public to obscure its
liability. A judge grants a motion to seal with probability 9, which takes
values between zero and one. We interpret 9 as the rule regarding
motions to seal. A higher 9 value means sealing is more likely to be
26
granted and thus represents a more permissible rule on sealing.
Accordingly, 9 = 1 represents the most permissible rule on sealing
(motions to seal are always granted), and 0 = 0 represents the least
permissible rule on sealing (motions to seal are never granted).
Discovery imposes costs on both D and P, which we denote by kD > 0
and k > 0 respectively.
In the fourth stage, D proposes a settlement offer to P. We use t
to denote the D's settlement offer made to P. We assume that settlement
offer is nonnegative. If P rejects the offer, the game proceeds to stage

24. Our main conclusions continue to hold if discovery reveals LYs liability only some of the
time.
25. See generally Kish Parella, Public Relations Litigation, 72 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (discussing the various measures corporate parties take to repair and enhance their
reputations).
26. We note that such a range of rules is possible given the discretion trial courts have in
granting motions to seal. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 597, 599 (1978) (holding
that such discretion should be used "in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case").
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five. If P accepts the offer, P receives payment t from D and then the
game ends.
The fifth stage of the game is a nonstrategic trial stage
representing courtroom proceedings. We assume that trial perfectly
reveals D's liability. When q = 1, D is liable for Ps loss and must make
monetary payment h to P. When q = 0, D is not liable and he does not
have to compensate P. Trial imposes costs on both D and P, which we
denote by cD > 0 and cp > 0 respectively.
We solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ("PBE") of the
game. A description of the equilibrium must define each player's
strategy and their beliefs about D's liability. In equilibrium, each
player's strategy must be the best response given the strategies of the
other players and the player's beliefs. Ps beliefs about D's liability must
be consistent with the Bayes' rule given D's strategy. 2 7 We use pi to
denote the probability that D takes the unlawful action in the first
period. If P experiences harm h, her belief that D is liable is
y - Pr(q = 1|h) =

.i

Pl+(1-pl)77

(1)

If P does not experience harm, she believes that D is not liable.
In order to focus the analysis on the most relevant parameter
cases, we introduce two assumptions regarding the value of Ps
potential loss h and D's cost of taking the lawful action ao.
First, we assume that the benefits to P of going to trial against
a liable defendant are positive:
h - kp - cp > 0.

(Al)

When this assumption is violated, P would never sue D and rules
regarding motions to seal have no impact on D's ex ante behavior. 28
Second, we assume that D's cost of taking the lawful action ao is
neither too large nor too small:
h-cp + (1- q)k

<K < h-cp + (1- q)kD + L.

(A2)

When A2 is violated, rules regarding motions to seal have no impact on
D's ex ante action. We assume A2 to focus on litigation in which rules
regarding motions to seal may affect deterrence.

27. Bayes' rule describes how to update probabilities of hypotheses given new evidence. See
Bradley Efron, Bayes' Theorem in the 21st Century, 340 SCIENCE 1177, 1177 (2013).
28. In a prior article we examine situations where this condition is violated and P essentially
files a nuisance suit. See Campos et al., supra note 23.

2018]

DISCOVERY DISCLOSURE AND DETERRENCE

2001

III. EQUILIBRIUM
In this Part, we use backward induction to derive the PBE of the
game described in Part II. Before we derive the equilibrium, we present
two useful results that greatly simplify our analysis.
Lenuna 1: In pretrialsettlement (i.e., the fourth stage of
the game), D in equilibrium proposes settlement offer
t = h - cp to P when q = 1, and offers t =0 when q = 0, and
P in equilibrium accepts D's offer in both cases.
Before the settlement stage, D's liability is perfectly revealed to
P in discovery. When q = 1, D is willing to offer any settlement offer t
no greater than h + CD. Knowing that D is liable, P is willing to accept
any settlement offer t no less than h - cp. In equilibrium, D offers
t = h - cp, the lowest payment that P is willing to accept. When q = 0, P
is willing to accept any settlement offer t that is nonnegative. Therefore,
D offers t = 0 to P and both parties settle before trial.
Lenuna 2: In discovery (i.e., the third stage of the game),
D in equilibriumalways files a motion to seal when q = 1.
When discovery reveals that D is liable for Ps harm, D always
files a motion to seal to obscure his liability. This result is intuitive
because sealing can prevent reputational losses for a liable D by
prohibiting the disclosure of documents or information that would
demonstrate D's liability.
We divide the possible equilibria into two categories. First, we
consider the possibility in which D plays a pure strategy when choosing
between action ao and ai. Second, we consider the possibility in which
D mixes between action ao and al.
A. Pure Strategy Equilibrium
We can rule out the existence of an equilibrium in which D
always takes the lawful action ao. In such an equilibrium, Ps
equilibrium belief about D's liability is consistent with D's action, and
thus P believes that D is not liable. In equilibrium, P does not sue D
after experiencing harm. Given Ps equilibrium strategy, D anticipates
payoff -K < 0 from the lawful action ao. When D deviates to the unlawful
action al, he expects payoff zero. Therefore, D has an incentive to
deviate to the unlawful action al and an equilibrium in which D always
takes the lawful action ao does not exist.

2002
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When the court is very likely to grant a motion to seal, there
exists an equilibrium in which D always takes the unlawful action al.
Specifically, such an equilibrium exists when
0

h-cp+(1-l)kD-K+L

L

(2)

Assumption A2 ensures that 0* is between zero and one. When
0 > 9*, the court is very likely to grant a motion to seal. D anticipates
that even if he is liable, he is likely to avoid reputational losses by
sealing evidence. This thus incentivizes D to always take the costless
but unlawful action al. A full characterization of the equilibrium must
specify each player's strategy and beliefs, which can be found in the
Appendix.
B. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Next, we consider the possibility of a mixed strategy
equilibrium, where D chooses the unlawful action al only some of the
time. We can show that such an equilibrium exists when
0

:5

_

h-cp+(1-)kD-K+L
L

(3)

77(cp+kp)
h-(1-77)(cp+kp)

(

In the mixed strategy equilibrium, D takes the unlawful action
al neither so infrequently that he is never sued, nor so frequently that
P always expects that he is liable. Rather, he mixes his choice of action
al and ao, taking action al just often enough to leave P indifferent
between suing or not suing after she experiences harm. In this
equilibrium, D takes the unlawful action al with probability

which is between zero and one because of assumption Al. The Appendix
provides a full characterization of the equilibrium.
IV. IMPACT OF A MORE PERMISSIVE SEALING RULE

The objective of our analysis is to study the impact of different
rules regarding sealing on a defendant's ex ante behavior. Since a more
permissible rule on sealing can be interpreted as an increase in Bin our
model, we consider the impact of an increase in 0 on D's decision to take
the unlawful action al.
As shown in Part III, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in
which D always chooses the unlawful action al when 0 is larger 0*.
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When 0 is in this range, changes in 9 have no impact on deterrence.
When 9 is no greater than 9, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium
in which D chooses the unlawful action al with a positive probability.
Since this probability is independent of 9, changes in 0 have no impact
on deterrence.
Now suppose that 9 increases from below 0* to above 0. The
analysis above implies that the probability that D takes the unlawful
action ai will increase from less than one to one.
Proposition 1: If 0 increases from below 0* to above 0*,
D is more likely to take the unlawful action al.
When a defendant decides whether to take an unlawful action,
he weighs the benefits and costs of the action. One of the costs of taking
the unlawful action is that D may experience reputational losses when
the public perceives that he is liable for Ps harm. D can avoid
reputational losses by sealing evidence in discovery. A more permissible
rule on sealing increases the probability that a judge grants a motion to
seal evidence in discovery, and thus reduces D's expected reputational
losses. This makes the liable action more attractive to D and D is thus
more likely to take the liable action.
V. EXTENSION WITH CHILLING EFFECTS

In this Part, we extend the model developed in Part II to take
into account chilling effects in which the threat of lawsuits makes a
potential defendant take an overly safe action from the perspective of
social welfare. 29 For example, a firm may stay out of a market because
of its fear of product liability lawsuits, or a doctor may decline to treat
high-risk patients to avoid potential malpractice lawsuits.
We consider an alternative model with an initial stage in which
D decides whether to choose an overly safe action as. This action does
not harm P and ensures that D is not sued. For example, a firm cannot
be sued for product liability if it stays out of a market, and a doctor
cannot be sued for malpractice if she refuses to treat patients. When D
chooses the overly safe action as in the first stage, the game ends. In
this case, P receives payoff zero and D receives payoff -Ks, where Ks > 0
represents the cost of taking action as. When D forgoes overly safe
action as, the game proceeds to the game described in Part II in which
D chooses between the lawful action ao and the unlawful action al. P
can perfectly observe whether D takes the overly safe action as, but she

29. See Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1179, 1189 (2013)
(discussing chilling effects).
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does not observe D's choice between the lawful action, ao, and the
unlawful action, al. This is consistent with the fact that it is easy to
observe whether a firm enters a market, or whether a doctor treats a
patient, but it is difficult to observe whether a firm engages in
anticompetitive behavior or whether a doctor takes sufficient care when
treating patients. In the analysis, we assume that the cost of taking
action as is neither too large nor too small:
(A3)

K < Ks < K +7kD.

When this assumption is violated, D either never chooses the overly safe
action as or always takes that action.
The following lemma summarizes D's decision with regard to the
overly safe action as in equilibrium.
Lenuna 3: In the model with chillingeffects, D forgoes the
overly safe action as and then mixes between ao and ai
when
(K-KS)(h-cp+k+L)+1
00 =-(K-KS)L
!

kDKS

D forgoes action as and then takes the unlawful action al
with probabilityone when
0>02~-=

-cp+kD-K+L
L

and D takes the overly safe action as with probability one
when 0 is between 01 and 02.
When 0 is below OI, D forgoes the overly safe action as and then
mixes between ao and al. As the rule regarding motions to seal becomes
more permissive (i.e., as 0 rises), D is more likely to avoid reputational
costs. This makes the unlawful action al more attractive to D. On the
other hand, an increase in 9 makes P more likely to file suit against D
after she experiences harm. This makes the unlawful action al less
attractive to D, and thus makes the overly safe action as more appealing
to D. When 0 takes moderate values, the second effect dominates the
first effect and D always takes the overly safe action as. When 0
becomes sufficiently large, however, the first effect dominates the
second effect and D always takes the unlawful action ai.
Proposition 2: A more permissible rule regarding
motions to seal (i.e., larger value of 8) can either increase
or decrease the chilling of a risky but socially optimal
action, depending on the initial rule on sealing.
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In our model, 9 that takes values smaller than 01 avoids chilling
and maximizes deterrence. Therefore, such a rule with regard to
motions to seal is optimal in our model. But this does not necessarily
mean that such a rule maximizes social welfare. A thorough welfare
analysis requires a more general consideration of all potential costs and
benefits of granting motions to seal, which is beyond the scope of this
Article. 30 Our goal is to show that a more permissive rule with regard
to motions to seal may decrease deterrence. We have proved this result
in Part IV and this result continues to hold if we consider the chilling
effect. Suppose 9 increases from values below O to values larger than
02 in the model with the chilling effect; Proposition 2 implies that such
a change will increase the probability that D takes the unlawful action
from below one to one.
Proposition 3: When 0 increasesfrom values below O to
values largerthan 02 in the model with the chilling effect,
D is more likely to take the unlawful action al.
Therefore, our main results continue to hold in the model with
the chilling effect: a more permissive rule with regard to motions to seal
may decrease deterrence.
VI. EXTENSION WITH PREDISCOVERY SETTLEMENT

In the main body of the Article, we assume that D and Pcan only
settle after discovery. In this Part, we consider the possibility that a
liable D can avoid reputational loss by settling with P before discovery,
and thus avoid the disclosure of any information to the public
altogether. 31 Accordingly, prediscovery settlement can serve as a
substitute for a motion to seal and can possibly make the permissibility
of a sealing rule have no impact on deterrence. Nevertheless, our results
in the baseline model continue to hold when we allow for prediscovery
settlement.
The model that we consider in this Part is the same as the model
introduced in Part II except that we allow P to propose a "take it or
leave it" settlement offer m to D after she files suit against D and before
discovery starts. If D accepts the offer, he pays m to P and the game
ends. If D rejects the offer, the game proceeds to discovery as in Part II.

30.

See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Multistage Adjudication, 33 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 613, 613

(2017) (conducting thorough welfare analysis of termination of lawsuits at different points in
multistage adjudication).
31. We do not consider the possibility that the parties settle only with respect to the motion
to seal (e.g., D pays P to not oppose a motion to seal). For a discussion of such "bespoke" discovery
procedures, see Erickson, supra note 1.
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The following lemma summarizes D's decision with regard to
action al and ao in the extension game with prediscovery settlement.
Lemma 4: In the extension model with prediscovery
settlement, there is an equilibrium in which D chooses al
with probability less than one when 0 is below 0*, and
there is an equilibrium in which D takes the unlawful
action al with probability one when 0 is above 0*.
Lemma 4 immediately implies the following proposition:
Proposition 4: In the extension model with prediscovery
settlement, D is more likely to take the unlawful action ai
if 0 increasesfrom below 0* to above 0*.
The intuition for the result is as follows: A more permissive rule
on sealing increases the probability that a motion to seal evidence is
granted, and thus reduces the likelihood that a defendant suffers
reputational losses. This reduces the amount of money that D is willing
to pay to settle with P before discovery. P anticipates this and demands
a smaller amount of money from D in the prediscovery settlement stage.
Therefore, a more permissive rule on sealing allows a liable D to settle
with P at a lower cost before discovery and thus makes the unlawful
action more attractive to D.
CONCLUSION

We conclude by discussing the two implications of our analysis.
First, our analysis supports the intuitive conclusion that a more
permissive standard for motions to seal will give a potential defendant
greater incentive to engage in "liable" conduct. However, our analysis
does not necessarily mean that a more permissive standard will lead to
a loss of social welfare. This is most evident in situations where we do
not want to chill beneficial behavior, such as research into vaccines or
life-saving drugs.
But such situations may also arise even when the potential
defendant is not "chilled" from engaging in the activity altogether.
Although our analysis denotes the more harmful action as the
"unlawful" action, in some circumstances the more harmful action may
be optimal as a matter of social welfare. For example, in strict liability
regimes the defendant would be liable no matter what action he chose,
and it may be socially optimal to engage in the more harmful action
(e.g., using dynamite rather than a less effective explosive for
demolition). Nevertheless, in those situations a defendant may be
deterred from taking the more harmful action because of the potentially
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irrational public response to its conduct, and thus sealing could protect
against such an irrational response.
Such irrational public response situations would require a
change in the law. Under current law, a court typically cannot find
"embarrassment" a sufficiently "compelling reason" to support a motion
to seal a dispositive motion. 32 However, given the common law status of
the right to public access, a change in the law would not be difficult to
implement. A larger concern is whether a court can accurately identify
those situations where a motion to seal would be justified given the
anticipated public reaction, although there may arise cases involving
panics which may be clear cut.
Second, under our analysis the more harmful, unlawful action
could be anything, including, as we referenced above, the failure to
perform safety tests. But actions involving learning new information
may incentivize a defendant to "play dumb" because, unlike other
harmful actions, a failure to gain such information could obscure the
defendant's liability. For example, one could imagine a defendant who
failed to keep any financial records, thus making it difficult for a
plaintiff to prove fraud.
Although we do not model a situation where the more harmful
action would reduce the probability of liability, our results would still
hold if liability was strictly imposed for such failures to investigate.
This is because such a strict liability rule for failing to investigate would
make such a failure no different from committing the unlawful act
itself. Indeed, such a strict liability rule for failing to investigate could
work in tandem with motions to seal-together, they can induce
defendants to gather such harmful information while protecting them
from irrational public reactions to that information.

32. See, e.g., Kamakana v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The mere
fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or
exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.").
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APPENDIX

Details for Section II.A:
Here we derive the pure strategy equilibrium discussed in
Section II.A. Consider an equilibrium in which D always takes the
unlawful action ai. In such an equilibrium, P believes D is liable after
experiencing harm and P anticipates benefits h - kp- cp > 0 from suing
D. As a result, P in equilibrium always sues D after she experiences
harm.
Given Ps strategy, D anticipates payoff -h + cF- kD - (1 - 9)L
from action al, and payoff -K- qkD from action ao. D prefers action al to
action ao when -h + cP - kD - (1 -

0 > 0*

_

)L > - K- qkD, or equivalently

A-cp+(1-7)kD-K+L
L

Therefore, when 9 > 0, the equilibrium outcome is as follows:
*
*

*
*

In stage 1, D always takes unlawful action al.
In stage 2, P sues D with probability one after
experiencing harm.
In stage 3, D files a motion to seal with probability one.
In stage 4, D offers settlement of t = h - cep and P accepts
the offer.
P believes that D is liable after she experiences harm.

Details for Section II.B:
Here we derive the mixed strategy equilibrium discussed in
Section II.B. We first show that when D mixes between al and ao in
equilibrium, P must mix between suing and not suing after she
experiences harm.
Suppose that P always sues D after she experiences harm. In
this case, D expects payoff -h + CD - kD - (1 - 9)L from action al, and
expects payoff -K - qkD from the lawful action ao. Assumption A2
implies that -h + cp - kD - (1 - )L < -K - qkD, so D prefers to always
take the lawful action ao. This contradicts that D plays mixed
strategies.
Next, suppose that P never sues D after experiencing harm. In
this case, D expects payoff zero from action al, and expects payoff -K
from action ao. Since 0 > -K, D prefers to always take the unlawful
action al. This contradicts that D plays mixed strategies.
Now we have ruled out the possibility that P plays pure strategy
when deciding whether to sue D. Therefore, P must mix between suing
and not suing D in equilibrium. Suppose that D takes action al with
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probability p1, and P sues D with probability ps after observing harm.
Given harm h, P is indifferent between suing and not suing when
P1

Pi+(1-pl)77

h-c,-k,-h=

-h.

The left-hand side of the above equation represents Ps expected payoff
from suing D, while the right-hand side of the above equation equals
her expected payoff from not suing D. Solving this equation, we have
D's equilibrium strategy

Pi

(c p+kp)
h-(1-il)(cp+kp)

Assumption Al ensures that pi is between zero and one.
D expects payoff ps (- h + cp - kD - (1 - 9) L) from action ai, and
anticipates payoff -K - )7 p, kD from action ao. In a mixed strategy
equilibrium, D is indifferent between al and ao. This is the case when
Ps (-h + cp - kD - (1- O)L) = -K - 7PskD*
Solving this equation, we have Ps equilibrium strategy

PS

K
= h- cp+ (1-77)kD+ (1- 9)L'

Assumption A2 and 0 < 0* ensures that ps is between zero and one.
Therefore, when 9 > 0*, the equilibrium outcome is as follows:
*

In stage 1, D always takes unlawful action al with
7(cp+kp)
probability p, =

*

In

h-(1-l)(Cp+kp)

*
*

*

stage

2,

P

sues

D

with

probability

after experiencing harm and
K
PS= -h- cp+ (1-77)kD+
(1- 9)L
does not sue D if not experiencing harm.
In stage 3, D files a motion to seal with probability one
when he is liable.
In stage 4, D offers settlement of t = h - cP if he takes the
unlawful action al in the first stage, and offers settlement
of t = 0 if he takes the lawful action ao in the first stage; P
accepts D's offer and the case is settled.
P believes that D is liable with probability cp+k after she
experiences harm.
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Proof of Lemma 3:
If D takes the overly safe action as, his payoff is -Ks. If D forgoes

the overly safe action as, the game proceeds to the subgame described
in Part II, which has two equilibria depending on the value of 9.
When 9< 6*, the subgame after D forgoes action as has a unique
equilibrium in which D mixes between action ao and ai. In this
equilibrium, D expects payoff

-K(1 +

JkD)

h- cp+ (1-il)kD+ (1- e)L

In the first stage of the game, D chooses the overly safe action as
when his payoff from action as is higher than his expected payoff from
forgoing action as. This is the case when
-Ks > -K(1 +

+ kD

7

h- cp+ (1-77)kD+ (1- 6)L

or equivalently
(K-KS)(h-cp+kD+L)+kDKS
(K-KS)L

Assumption A3 ensures that 0 < 01 <0*. Therefore, when Ois between O9
and 0*, there is an equilibrium in which D takes the overly safe action
as. When Ois below 0, there is an equilibrium in which D forgoes action
as and then mixes between ao and al.
When 0 > Oj, the subgame after D forgoes the overly safe action
as has a unique equilibrium in which D always takes the unlawful
action al. In this equilibrium, D expects payoff
-

(1 -

9)L

.

-h + cp - kD

In the first stage of the game, D chooses the overly safe action as
when it gives him higher payoff than forgoing action as. This is the case
when
-Ks > -h + cp - kD -

(1 -

6)L,

or equivalently
-hCp+kD-Ks+L
L

Assumption A3 ensures that 92 > 0. Therefore, when 9 is between 0'
and 92, there is an equilibrium in which D takes the overly safe action
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as. When 0 is larger than 92, there is an equilibrium in which D forgoes
action as and then takes the unlawful action ai.
Proof of Lemma 4:
In the extension model with prediscovery settlement, a liable D
anticipates payoff -h + cp - kD - (1 - 9)L if he rejects Ps settlement offer
and the case proceeds to discovery. If D accepts Ps settlement offer, he
receives payoff -m. Therefore, a liable D is willing to accept settlement
offer m 5 h - cp + kD + (1 - 9)L. A nonliable D anticipates payoff -kD from
discovery and thus is only willing to pay m < kD to settle the case.
Pure strategy equilibrium:
Consider an equilibrium in which D always takes the unlawful
action ai. In such an equilibrium, P believes that D is liable after
experiencing harm and thus anticipates that D is willing to pay
m 5 h - cp + kD + (1 - 9)L to settle the case. Therefore, P demands
q = h - cp + kD + (1 - 9)L from D and D accepts the offer to settle before
trial.
Given Ps strategy, D anticipates payoff -h + cP - kD - (1 - 9)L
from action al and payoff -K- ikD from action ao. D prefers action ai to
action ao when

-h + cp- kD- (1-9)L > -K

-

qkD,

or equivalently
0

>*

O-

f-cp+(1-77)kD-K+L
L

Assumption A2 ensures that 0* is between zero and one. Therefore,
when 0 > 0*, the equilibrium outcome is as follows:
*
*
*

*

In stage 1, D takes the unlawful action al with probability
one.
In stage 2, P sues D with probability one after
experiencing harm.
In stage 3, P demands m = h - cp'+ kD + (1- 8)L from D to
settle the case, and D agrees to pay such amount to settle
the case.
P believes that D is liable after she experiences harm.
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Mixed strategy equilibrium:
Now let's consider an equilibrium in which D mixes between
action al and action ao. We can easily verify that in such an equilibrium
P sometimes demands payment m = h - cp + kD + (1 - 9)L from D and
sometimes demands payment m = kD from D in the prediscovery
liable D is willing to pay
Only a
stage.
settlement
m = h - cp + kD + (1 - 9)L to settle the case. Both a liable and nonliable
D is willing to pay m = kD to settle the case.
P is indifferent between demanding m = h - cp + kD + (1 - 9)L
and demanding m = kD when
Pif

Pi+(1--t)77

+ kD + (1

(-c

-

O)L) + 1-

Pi

)

Pl+(1-Pi)77

(-kp

-

h)= -h + kD,

which gives
Pi

n(kD+kp)
= h-cp+n(kD+kp)+(1-8)L

Assumption Al ensures pi is between zero and one.
Suppose that P demands payment m = h - cp + kD + (1 - )L with
payoff
D anticipates
strategy,
Given Ps
probability pm.
pm (-h + cP - kD - (1 - 9)L) + (1 - pm)(-kD) from action al and payoff
-K - r7kD from action ao. D is indifferent between action al and action
ao when these actions give him the same expected payoff. By setting
these payoffs equal, we have
K-(1-7l)kD

PM

= h-cp+(1-8)L

Assumptions Al, A2, and 9 < 9" ensure pm is between zero and one.
Therefore, when 0<0*, the equilibrium outcome is as follows:
*

In stage 1, D takes the unlawful action al with probability
Pi

*

*

77(kD+kp)
= P-cp+(kD+kp)+(1-e)L*

In stage 2, P sues D with probability one after
experiencing harm and sues D with probability zero if she
does not experience harm.
In stage 3, P demands m = h - cp + kD + (1 - )L from D
with probability pm = h-cp+(1-9)L
K-(1-7)kD
and demands payment
m = kD from D with the complementary probability; a
liable
D is willing
to
pay no
more than
m = h - cp + kD + (1 - 9)L to settle the case, and a
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nonliable D is willing to pay no more than m = kD to settle
the case.
In stage 4, D files a motion to seal evidence with
probability one when he is liable.
In stage 5, D offers t = h - cp when he is liable and t = 0
when he is not liable; P accepts D's offer and the case is
settled.
After experiencing harm, P believes that D is liable with
kD+kp
probability h-Cp+kD+kp+(1-0)L

